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Abstract—Access to network traffic records is an integral
part of recognizing and addressing network security breaches.
Even with the increasing sophistication of network attacks, basic
network events such as connections between two IP addresses
play an important role in any network defense. Given the
duration of current attacks, long-term data archival is critical
but typically very little of the data is ever accessed. Previous work
has provided tools and identified the need to trace connections.
However, traditional databases raise performance concerns as
they are optimized for querying rather than ingestion.
The study of write-optimized data structures (WODS) is
a new and growing field that provides a novel approach to
traditional storage structures (e.g., B-trees). WODS trade minor
degradations in query performance for significant gains in the
ability to quickly insert more data elements, typically on the
order of 10 to 100 times more inserts per second. These efficient,
out-of-memory data structures can play a critical role in enabling
robust, long-term tracking of network events.
In this paper, we present TWIAD, the Write-optimized IP
Address Database. TWIAD uses a write-optimized B-tree known
as a Bε tree to track all IP address connections in a network
traffic stream. Our initial implementation focuses on utilizing
lower cost hardware, demonstrating that basic long-term tracking
can be done without advanced equipment. We tested TWIAD on
a modest desktop system and showed a sustained ingestion rate
of about 20,000 inserts per second.
I. INTRODUCTION
The recent hack of the US government’s Office of Personel
Management (OPM) exposed the personal information of
millions of federal employees. The OPM breach illustrates
the critical role that network monitoring systems have and will
continue to play in cybersecurity. According to the Department
of Homeland Security (DHS), an intrusion-detection program
called Einstein was involved in the response to the breach [1].
DHS’s Computer Emergency Readiness Team used the Ein-
stein system to discover the recent hack at OPM. After OPM
suffered a breach in March 2014, the agency beefed up its
cybersecurity via a “comprehensive network monitoring plan,
through which OPM detected new malicious activity.”
Tracking network events continues to play an integral part
of securing data and communication networks. This includes
being able to store all of the connections occurring over
a network, enabling applications such as intrusion detection
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and post-event forensics. Effective network event tracking
requires data structures that can consistently provide strong
ingestion performance guarantees over long periods of time.
Furthermore, recent public compromises such as the OPM
breach have highlighted the need for maintaining records that
cover years worth of traffic.
Many institutions use common data stores such as
Hadoop [2] in server clusters on advanced hardware for net-
work situational awareness. Although this solution may be per-
formant, it is costly because of the hardware and maintenance
involved. We wanted a lightweight solution with a smaller
start-up cost that maintained high performance guarantees.
Other situational awareness solutions use large databases
based on Bloom filters, a probabilistic data structure for
approximate membership queries [3]. Bloom filters are placed
in front of data structures such as B-trees and improve query
performance by providing constant-time, negative answers to
point queries. Since our solution must be efficient for point and
range queries, Bloom filters alone are insufficient because they
do not improve range query performance. Moreover, Bloom
filters are only viable when they can be contained within RAM,
limiting their ability to keep long-term data that grows without
bound.
Finally, it might seem that solid state drives (SSDs) solve
many of the issues associated with network traffic ingestion
since they have random I/O performance and latency orders
of magnitude better than traditional spinning hard-disk drives
(HDDs). However, SSDs are substantially more expensive per
gigabyte than HDDs, which can be a prohibitive barrier to
widespread use of SSDs for network monitoring.
Furthermore, the issue of write amplification occurs
uniquely in SSDs because the actual physical size of the data
written to disk may be a multiple of the logical size of the data
intended to be written [4]. Flash memory uses relocate-on-
write, which erases memory before it is rewritten and requires
garbage-collection because the erase operation is much less
precise than the write operation. Therefore, writing to a SSD
requires accessing and moving user data and metadata more
than once. Rewriting on the disk reads, updates, and rewrites
existing physical data to a new location on the disk. Larger
amounts of data must be erased and rewritten than the actual
amount required by the new data. Flash memory disk blocks
wear out as data is erased and rewritten, shortening the life of
an SSD. As a result of cost and write amplification, SSDs alone
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are not a solution to the challenges of network monitoring on
a large scale. Therefore, our solution must perform well on
HDDs as well as SSDs.
We therefore propose the use of write-optimized data struc-
tures (WODS) [5]–[10] for I/O-efficient tracking of long-term
network traffic. WODS are designed to resolve the bottleneck
caused by writing to disk and can ingest data up to two orders
of magnitude faster than traditional B-trees. Additionally,
WODS mitigate write amplification in SSDs by writing larger
blocks of data to disk at a time and reducing the amount of
physical memory that needs to be deleted and rewritten.
Write-optimization has been successfully implemented in
many commercial key-value stores and databases [11]–[17].
Additionally, previous research demonstrates the feasibility of
write-optimization in indexing core system components such
as file systems [18].
We present TWIAD, a write-optimized database tailored to
IP address tracking. We use the mature Bε-tree implementation
from Tokutek’s Fractal Tree Index (ft-index) [16] as the
index under TWIAD. While we initially focus on tracking
IP addresses, our system is generic and can easily be adapted
to track other network data such as domain names, complete
URLs, and email addresses. Our initial results show that a Bε-
tree-based index provides a feasible, lightweight, and portable
database for tracking network events. Our contributions in-
clude:
• the application of write-optimized data structures to net-
work event tracking
• the design and implementation of a write-optimized IP
address database (TWIAD) and associated query tools
• an initial performance analysis of TWIAD on basic
hardware showing a high ingest rate of 20,000 entries
per second.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: we review
related work and background information in Section II, de-
scribe the requirements and resulting design in in Section III,
present our results in Section IV, discuss future applications
of TWIAD and write-optimized data structures as a whole in
Section V, and conclude our work in Section VII.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
In this section, we describe write-optimized data structures,
streaming databases, and existing network event tracking sys-
tems.
A. Write-Optimized Data Structures
Here, we cover write-optimized data structures and their
performance bounds. Specifically, we describe the Bε-tree and
the reasons we have chosen it for network event tracking. The
best WODS (including the Bε-tree) subvert a trade-off between
read and write performance and instead can outperform B-
trees.
The B-tree is a data structure where internal nodes have
variable numbers of children within a predefined range. The
elements of the tree are maintained in sorted order at the
leaves. Each internal node has keys directing searches to
the subtree associated with the query value. B-trees support
insertions, deletions, sequential accesses, and point queries in
O(logB N) time.
1) Bε trees: A Bε-tree is a B-tree with buffers at each node.
New insertions take place at the root buffer of the Bε-tree.
When a node’s buffer is filled, items are moved from that
node’s buffer to the buffer of one of it’s children—this process
is referred to as flushing. The algorithms for point and range
queries are the same as those in a B-tree, but with a search
through the buffer of each internal node on a root-to-leaf path.
Bε-trees have asymptotically better performance than B-
trees. For example, consider a B-tree of N elements where
each node has B keys of constant size and where the the size
of keys is far larger than the size of the related data. Such a tree
has fanout B and therefore has height O(logB N). Therefore,
inserts and searches will take O(logB N) I/Os. A range query
with k results then requires O(logB N +
k
B ) I/Os.
In contrast, a Bε-tree has nodes of size B. Each internal
node of the tree has Bε children where 0 <ε ≤ 1. Each node
has a “pivot key” for each child, so the keys take up Bε space
in each node. The remaining B − Bε space in each node is
used to buffer inserted elements.
ε is a tunable parameter that determines the tree’s fanout.
The tree’s fanout is Bε and its height is O(logBε N) =
O( 1ε logB N). Therefore, searches in a B
ε-tree are slower
than those in a B-tree by a factor of 1ε . However, whenever
a node flushes elements to one of its children, it moves
at least B−B
ε
Bε ≈ B1−ε elements. Each element must be
flushed O( 1ε logB N) (the height of the tree) times to reach
a leaf. Therefore, the amortized cost of inserting N ele-
ments is O( 1εB1−ε logB N). Furthermore, range queries cost
O( 1ε logB N + k/B) I/Os where k is the number of elements
returned by the query.
We present an example: consider ε = 1/2. Point and
range query costs are now O(logB N) and O(logB N +
k
B )
respectively. Although these are the same asymptotically as
query bounds for B-trees, the insert cost for the Bε-tree is
O( logB N√
B
), an improvement by a factor of
√
B over traditional
B-trees.
Additionally, Bε trees have much larger nodes than B-trees.
Larger nodes improve range query performance because the
data is spread over fewer nodes and therefore requires fewer
disk accesses to read it in. B-trees must use smaller nodes
because every new addition to the database requires that a node
be completely rewritten. In contrast, writes are batched in Bε
trees, allowing their nodes to be much larger than those of a
B-tree — for example, nodes in a B-tree are generally around
4 or 6KB, while a typical node in Tokutek’s implementation
of a Bε-tree is 4MB. As a result, the height of a Bε tree is not
much greater than that of a B-tree on the same data. Therefore,
point query performance in a Bε tree is comparable to point
query performance in a B-tree.
For example, consider a key-value store of 1TB of data,
with keys of size 128B and records (key+value) of size 1KB
— assume that data is logged and that all updates in the log
are periodically applied to the main tree in batch. Assume that
a common server has about 64GB of RAM.
First, we examine a B-tree with 4KB nodes given the above
situation. The fanout of the tree is 4KB/128B = 32. Even if all
of the internal nodes of the tree can fit into RAM, only a small
fraction of the 1TB of leaf nodes can be held in cache. Given
a sequence of random insertions, most updates will require 2
I/Os — 1 I/O to read in the target leaf and another to write it
back to disk.
In constrast, consider a Bε-tree with branching factor 10
and nodes with size 1MB. Again, all internal nodes can fit in
cache, but the leaves must be held on disk. When items are
inserted into the tree, they are stored in the tree’s root buffer.
The root is cached, so this action requires no I/Os. When an
internal node becomes full and flushes to a non-leaf child, the
data structure requires two writes — one to update the parent
and one to update the child. Since both nodes are cached, no
reads are necessary. If an internal node flushes its buffer to a
leaf, one read is required to load the leaf into memory. There
will be 1TB/1MB=220 leaves. Furthermore, the tree has fanout
10, so its height will be 1+log10 2
20 ≈ 7. Therefore, each item
is involved in 14 I/Os because it is written and read once at
each level of the tree.
While it may seem that this performance is worse than that
of a B-tree, each flush in the Bε-tree moves ∼1MB/10≈100kB
of data, or around 100 items. The data moved in each flush
is approximately proportional to the node size divided by the
branching factor. Therefore, the amortized cost of flushing an
item to a leaf is 14/100. A B-tree requires 2 I/Os for each
item, so in our example the Bε tree can insert data 2/(14/100)
≈ 14 times faster than the equivalent B-tree. Furthermore, this
speedup grows as key-value pairs get smaller as in connection
log storage.
Both the B-tree and the Bε tree require a single I/O to read
the corresponding leaf in a point query. However, range queries
can be much faster in a Bε-tree because the Bε-tree seeks once
for each leaf size. In our example, the B-tree would need to
seek every 4KB whereas the Bε tree would seek once every
1MB.
Bε-trees can achieve further improved performance through
upserts, an efficient method for updating key-value pairs. If
an application wants to update a value associated with some
key k in the tree, it inserts a message (k, (f,∆)) into the tree,
where f is some function that can be used to apply the change
denoted by ∆ to the old value associated with k.
This message is inserted into the tree normally. However,
when the message is flushed from a node to one of its children
C, the tree checks whether C’s buffer contained the old value
v associated with the key k. If so, then the tree replaces v
with f(v,∆) and discards the upsert.
If the key k is queried before the function from the upsert
message is applied, the Bε-tree calculates f(v,∆) while
answering the query — this does not affect query performance
because an upsert for a key k will always be on the path
from the root to the leaf containing k. Therefore, upserts can
improve update speed by orders of magnitude without reducing
query performance.
2) Log-structured Merge Trees: The log-structured merge
tree (LSM tree) [19], [20] is another write-optimized data
TABLE I
ASYMPTOTIC I/O COSTS OF VARIOUS WRITE-OPTIMIZED DATA
STRUCTURES
Data Structure Insert Point Query
w/o Upserts
Point Query
w/ Upserts
Range Query
B-tree logB N logB N logB N logB N +
k
B
LSM logB N
εB1−ε
log2B N
ε
log2B N
ε
log2B N
ε
+ k
B
LSM+BF logB N
εB1−ε log
2
B N
log2B N
ε
log2B N
ε
+ k
B
Bε-tree logB N
εB1−ε
logB N
ε
logB N
ε
logB N
ε
+ k
B
structure. There are many variations on the LSM tree, but
generally they have a logarithmic number of indices (data
structures, e.g., B-trees) of exponentially increasing size. Once
an index at one level fills up, it is flushed and merged into the
index at the next largest level. Commercial write-optimized
databases often use LSM trees.
Although LSM trees can have the same asymptotic com-
plexity as a Bε-tree, queries in a naı¨ve implementation of
a LSM tree can be slow, as shown in Table I. Steps have
been taken to improve the query performance of LSM trees—
of note, many implentations of LSM trees now use Bloom
filters [3] at each index [11]–[15]. Point queries in LSMs with
Bloom filters have been reported to improve to O(logB N),
therefore matching B-tree point query performance.
However, Bloom filters do not help with range queries,
because the successor of any key may be at any level of
the data structure. Furthermore, the viability of Bloom filters
degrades with upserts. To compute the result of a query, all
relevant upserts must be applied to the key-value pair. If there
are many possible upserts at each level of the LSM tree,
searches need to be performanced at each of those levels.
LSMs only match B-tree query performance in specific cases,
while Bε-trees match B-tree query times in general.
Since range queries are common in network event detection
systems, we chose Bε-trees as the underlying data structure for
TWIAD because of LSM range query performance.
B. Streaming Databases
A great deal of progress has also been made in the re-
lated field of stream processing engines (SPE). While data
stream managers have important applications in network event
tracking, most of the literature is focused on developing
query schemes and algorithms [21]–[24]. Some of the issues
identified by the streaming community such as approximate
query results, updating query results over time, and dynamic
query modification are outside of the scope of this paper.
Our vision for TWIAD is that of a write-optimized stream-
ing database for network event tracking. Connection logs are
constantly fed into the database — the main goal is to process
a large volume of data consistently over time while main-
taining ingestion guarantees. Streaming research has important
applications to network event tracking and write-optimization.
We are currently focusing on optimizing ingestion and leave
the integration of results from streaming research as future
work to optimize queries.
C. Network Event Tracking Databases
Previous development has also been done on large databases
for network traffic monitoring. Network traffic monitoring so-
lutions differ from traditional relational database management
systems (RDBMSs) in the following ways:
1) The data and storage must be stream-oriented. Fast
ingestion and sequential access are important, while fast
random access and concurrency control are not.
2) Since network traffic data is usually only used a few
times (or even once), load time is a significant cost.
Therefore, the database must maintain data integrity over
long periods of time while still loading streams of data
into the database.
3) Network connection logs are aggregations of many small
records with fields a few bytes wide, so per-tuple over-
head in RDBMSs can lead to a prohibitive cost in space.
Prior work on network event tracking databases has focused
on developing query languages for streams. Systems like
Gigascope [25] and Tribeca [26] propose query languages
for complex analysis. The inventors of the existing systems
note that performance for a stream database is measured by
how high the input stream(s) rate can be before it begins
dropping data, not how fast the database can answer queries.
Specifically, Cranor et al. observe that “touching disk kills
performance—not because it is slow but because it generates
long and unpredictable delays throughout the system.” Our
system, TWIAD is designed to specialize in ingesting data
quickly and predictably.
D. Write-Optimized Intrusion Detection Systems
Some IDS companies are beginning to offer services that in-
clude write-optimized databases. For example, Countertack, an
IDS software company, uses big data analytics from Cloudera,
which is built on Hadoop and HBase [27]. Similarly, Googles
Stenographer does simple packet capture and uses LevelDB
for storage [28]. It is designed to write packets to disk quickly
and not well suited to reading back large amounts of packets.
Finally, Hogzilla is another open source IDS supported by
Snort, Apache Spark, and HBase [29].
While these systems are important steps towards using write
optimization in network event tracking, we wanted to build a
lighter-weight and simple tool that processes logs while still
leaving the user freedom to determine what kind of analytics
they want to do on the data.
III. REQUIREMENTS AND DESIGN
TWIAD is a write-optimized database built on Tokutek’s
Fractal Tree index, an implementation of a Bε-tree.
A. Requirements
We designed TWIAD to leverage the performance strengths
of Bε-trees. We focused primarily on ingestion performance—
the database will answer queries, but most of the computation
is spent on inserting events documented in connection logs
into the database.
TABLE II
EXAMPLE ROW STRUCTURE OF BRO CONNECTION LOG
field ts uid id.orig h id.orig p
type time string addr port
value 980997832.690939 Ch80yl33lQkOymHcab 209.11.146.100 111
field id.resp h id.resp p proto service
type addr port enum string
value 0.254.205.104 36831 tcp -
field duration orig bytes resp bytes conn state
type interval count count string
value 0.075242 0 0 RSTOS0
field local orig missed bytes history orig pkts
type bool count string count
value - 0 HR 2
field orig ip bytes resp pkts resp ip bytes tunnel parents
type count count count set[string]
value 84 0 0 (empty)
B. Software
We used the publicly available Bε-tree implementation (ft-
index) from Tokutek [30].
Our contribution is a system designed to mediate between
network connection data and the underlying Bε-tree while
simultaneously answering queries. We chose to implement
this layer in C because the original index was in C and we
wanted to maximize performance without going through other
languages.
One of our design goals for the database is for the index
to be “loosely coupled” with the IDS. Therefore, we chose to
implement it as a tool for processing logs from the IDS rather
than integrating it with the IDS. That also means that the IDS
can handle bursts, since it is always just logging. The indexer
can run in the background at low priority, it can fall behind
and then later catch up when the system is less busy.
C. Database Design
The database is designed specifically to store network
connection logs — we used logs from the Bro IDS system,
a sessionization and intrusion detection tool. Fields from a
typical connection log and an example row are provided in
Table II. The database can easily be extended to ingest other
types of logs and inputs.
We want to access any connection information regarding
an IP in a query, regardless of whether it was the origin or
responder IP. Therefore, we insert every row in the connection
logs twice — once with the the origin and responder IP
address and port in the order of the original row as specified in
Table III and again with the origin and responder IP addresses
and ports switching order in the key as detailed in Table V.
The value is the remaining fields not included in the key.
As a result, two database entries are created for each row in
a connection log. To indicate which of the entries is “reversed”
(i.e. the order of the origin and responder ports and addresses
was switched), we set the byte isReversed to 1 if the entry
was reversed and 0 otherwise.
The key and value formats are described in Table III and
Table IV are based on Bro log format. We chose this format
in order to query specific IP addresses as well as range over
time for that IP address. Furthermore, we appended the other
fields to the key to prevent the possibility of collisions.
TABLE III
KEY DESIGN
Byte Range Length Field
[0, 3] 4 Origin IP
[4, 11] 8 Timestamp (*10000 second since epoch)
[12, 14] 3 Origin Port
[15, 18] 4 Destination IP
[19, 21] 3 Destination Port
TABLE IV
VALUE DESIGN
Byte Range Length Field
[0, 3] 4 Protocol
[4, 11] 8 Duration
[12, 19] 8 Origin Bytes
[20, 27] 8 Response Bytes
[28, 32] 5 Connection State
[33, 36] 4 Origin Packets Bytes (sans header)
[37, 40] 4 Response Packets Bytes (sans header)
[41] 1 isReversed
D. Client Architecture
We designed a client-side CLI tool to relay queries from an
authorized user to the server and to receive and display results.
The goals of the CLI tool were to easily integrate into users’
workflows and respond to queries. Results of the queries are
given in some value-separated format for easy user processing.
Common queries include searching for connections with a
specific IP address or subnet or over some time range.
We provide a few examples of usage:
/twiad:twiad-client --ip 18.281.23.9
The first query requests all connections involving a specific
IP address over all time stored in the database.
/twiad:twiad-client --subnet
13.48.133.201/8 --year
The second query requests all connections involving the
specified subnet over the past year. There are flags available
to query the past week, month, quarter, and year.
/twiad:twiad-client --subnet
13.48.133.201/16 --start 2010:1:2:10:30:5
The third query requests all connections involving the
specified subnet starting from the beginning of the time
period after the start flag. Times are entered in the format
yyyy:mm:dd:hh:mm:ss. For example, the above time is Jan-
uary 2 10:30:05 0700 MST 2010.
The tool also allows the user to specify the end of a
requested time period with --end.
IV. RESULTS
To benchmark TWIAD we used the publicly available
backscatter dataset from the Center for Applied Internet Data
TABLE V
REVERSED KEY DESIGN
Byte Range Length Field
[0, 3] 4 Destination IP
[4, 11] 8 Timestamp (*10000 seconds since epoch)
[12, 14] 3 Destination port
[15, 18] 4 Origin IP
[19, 21] 3 Origin Port
Fig. 1. Insertion rate vs. number of inserts
Analysis (CAIDA) [31]. We ran tests on several basic PCs
and measured the number of inserts completed every minute
as well as tracking the duration of insert transactions. While
our systems initially saw high insertion rates as the size of our
database grew we stabilize to a steady state of approximately
20,000 inserts per second. We benchmarked both the fractal
tree index (Bε-tree) and Berkeley DB (B-tree).
To provide a test data set, we generated Bro connection
logs from the backscatter dataset. The dataset consists of
collections of responses to spoofed traffic sent by denial-of-
service attack victims and received by the UC San Diego
(UCSD) Network Telescope. Data was collected between
2001 and 2008. While not perfectly representative of normal
network traffic it certainly represents actual network traffic and
presents a challenging data set.
We ran our tests on a basic desktop PC with 32 gigabytes
of RAM and Intel i7-2600 CPU at 3.40GHz. This system is
representative of a typical older desktop that an organization
could repurpose as an IP address database system.
A. Ingestion Performance
As a basic metric to monitor our systems ingestion rate,
we recorded the amount of time it takes to insert a constant
number of rows (e.g., 100,000). That is, we keep track of the
time that it takes to insert each 100,000 rows.
From this we calculate the average number of inserts per
second over that period. Figure 1 shows the average insertion
rate plotted against total number of database entries inserted
for both the fractal tree and traditional B tree.
We can see that the database built on the fractal tree index
(Bε-tree)has a sustained insertion rate of 20,000 rows per
second for over 1 billion rows. in contrast, the ingestion rate
for the database built on BerkeleyDB (B-tree) is similar to
that of the fractal tree index in the beginning but quickly and
severely drops off to about 100 inserts per second.
B. Query Response Time
We tested a few queries around the size range that a typical
user might execute. In our experience, a simple point query
Fig. 2. Query Performance Measurements (121.5 M entries in DB)
came back in well under one second on a database with around
121.5 million entries. Figure 2 shows the time that it took a
database using a fractal tree index with about 121.5 million
entries to answer range and point queries. We observe that
reasonably sized queries that network analysts generally expect
return in well under a second. Queries are fast because write-
optimization makes indexing more efficient.
As shown in table VI, queries for IP addresses in our
database generally return in under a second, while the same
search using grep takes multiple seconds or even minutes.
Query times on the order of tenths of a second will allow
network analysts to more quickly discover and respond to
network events. This is a significant improvement over a
common strategy of searching through connection logs.
TABLE VI
FRACTAL TREE QUERY VS GREP PERFORMANCE (121.5 M DATABASE
ENTRIES)
IP Queried Rows Returned Time (grep, s) Time (twiad, s)
0.183.158.39 3 6.242 0.030878
202.178.243.254 7697311 796.276 37.528948
61.132.23.66 600328 160.858 2.630128
210.117.64.88 15513 10.386 0.096910
210.117.64.222 20106 10.833 0.114642
210.117.64.16 21005 35.084 0.126801
210.117.64.84 21785 11.350 0.126013
208.149.123.22 543 7.605 0.040972
195.158.245.52 126186 16.253 0.570452
200.42.64.226 15661 7.372 0.082603
V. APPLICATIONS
A. Intrusion Detection
A great deal of progress has been made on network intrusion
detection systems that monitor network traffic for predefined
patterns and alert system administrators when potentially
problematic network traffic is detected. Previous work focuses
on machine learning algorithms and frameworks for intru-
sion detection [32]–[34]. Additionally, systems like Bro and
Snort [35], [36] are lightweight intrusion-detection tools that
take steps toward resolving issues with complex deployment
and high cost.
TWIAD has important applications in network intrusion
detection. It allows queries over long time periods and can
efficiently store large amounts of data while maintaining inser-
tion performance guarantees. Users can ask for all instances of
an IP or subnet over a time range and analyze the connections
related to a potentially suspicious or adversarial IP. Efficiently
storing and having access to previous connection logs allows
network analysis to examine threats and take steps towards
recovery.
B. Data Visualization
Write-optimized databases for network event tracking can
also be used in data visualization efforts on network traffic.
Previous work with visualization focuses on the graphical
representation of network flows [37]. Combining previous
work on pattern detection and visualization with faster packet
storage will improve the scope and utility of the representa-
tions.
VI. FUTURE WORK
While TWIAD has seen success in processing long-term
large-scale network traffic events, there is still much to be
done.
For example, we would like to include applications of write-
optimization to sessionization tools such as Bro. The power
of upserts would be especially beneficial because the row
corresponding to a connection could be efficiently updated
as packets arrive. Although our implementation did not take
advantage of upserts because we did not need to update rows,
we can leverage the performance gains resulting from upserts
in future work in updating the database or deleting from it.
In order to learn more about our system’s performance,
we would like to continue testing against other large-scale
database systems such as Hadoop, Accumulo, and Cassandra
to determine the relative performance of TWIAD against cur-
rently popular solutions for analysis of large datasets. Future
experiments will also include tests on more robust hardware to
determine the performance of write-optimized data structures
on a variety of test systems and where they provide the greatest
speedup.
As discussed in Section II, previous related work explores
the development of query languages for network event track-
ing. Although our current work focuses on ingestion perfor-
mance, we will use other results to improve query performance
and allow more specific requests to the database. Thus, we
leave a comparison of TWIAD against other network event
and stream tracking databases such as Gigascope, Borealis,
and Tribeca as future work.
Additionally, we will perform experiments to analyze pos-
sible adversarial attacks on the data structure. The amortized
cost of inserting new elements in the database is at least
an order of magnitude faster than traditional structures such
as B-trees. As the Bε-tree grows large, the time to flush
down a root-to-leaf path grows because the height of the
tree increases. The flushing mechanism may trigger a cascade
effect that requires multiple flushes lower in the tree when
the root node is flushed. Future experiments will analyze data
loss on a stream of network connections over time. We will
explore whether there is a data pattern or speed of arrival that
triggers a catastrophic sequence of buffer flushes and I/Os that
impact database performance. For example, the database will
experience a burst in connections during a denial-of-service
attack and has to keep up by ingesting the connection data.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
TWIAD demonstrates the potential of write-optimized data
structures for network event tracking. We have created a
lightweight, portable system that can be installed on a simple
server and monitor network traffic. Furthermore, we were
able to track connections with a generic server and modest
hardware. For smaller institutions with moderate resources,
TWIAD can easily be installed on a spare machine, store
information about connections, and maintain situational aware-
ness of the network. We have seen sustained ingestion rates of
around 20,000 inserts per second that support the feasibility
of TWIAD as a real-time network event tracking system.
Future work will focus on additional testing against other
systems and improvements to make the database more
amenable to data analysis. Our work indicates that future
applications of write-optimization in network security are
likely to improve performance.
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